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The Charter’s Infl uence Around the 
World
MARK TUSHNET *
Over the past several decades, the infl uence of the United States Constitution and Supreme 
Court around the world has waned while that of the Canadian Charter and Supreme Court has 
increased. This article examines several reasons for these changes, including: the relative ages 
of the constitutions; the US Supreme Court’s recent conservatism; the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s role in developing the doctrine of proportionality; the US Supreme Court’s interest in 
originalism; differing structures of constitutional review and judicial supremacy; and the two 
Courts’ relative openness to transnational infl uences.
Au cours des dernières décennies, l’infl uence partout au monde de la Constitution américaine 
et de la Cour suprême des États-Unis a décliné, tandis que celle de la Charte canadienne 
et de la Cour suprême du Canada a augmenté. Cet article examine les diverses raisons 
à l’origine de ces changements, notamment l’âge relatif de ces constitutions, le récent 
conservatisme de la Cour suprême des États-Unis, le rôle de la Cour suprême du Canada 
dans l’élaboration de la doctrine de la proportionnalité, l’intérêt de la Cour suprême des 
États-Unis pour l’originalisme, les structures différentes de la revue de la constitution et 
de la suprématie de l’appareil judiciaire, ainsi que l’ouverture relative des deux cours aux 
infl uences transnationales.
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. An earlier version of this 
article was presented at the inaugural Osgoode Hall Law Journal Symposium, “Canada’s Rights 
Revolution: A Critical and Comparative Symposium on the Canadian Charter,” Osgoode Hall 
Law School, York University, Toronto (14 September 2012). I thank Benjamin Berger, Jamie 
Cameron, and participants in the Symposium for their helpful comments on this article.
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EVALUATING THE WORLDWIDE INFLUENCE of a nation’s constitution or a supreme 
court lies somewhere between a parlour game and an analysis of the deployment of 
“soft power” in international relations.1 Th e exercise is like a parlour game in that 
we do not have good metrics for evaluating infl uence. Recent eff orts to quantify 
the international infl uence of national constitutions are intriguing2 but rely on 
the creation of indices of similarity and the like, the content of which can be readily 
challenged by skeptics. And, notably, the quantifi cation involves only constitutions 
and the provisions found within them, not the interpretations of those provisions. 
Yet, my sense is that conversations about infl uence deal much more with the spread 
of judicial interpretations than with the diff usion of constitutional provisions.3 
Th e evidence invoked in such conversations is impressionistic and anecdotal.
1. Originating the term, Joseph Nye defi ned “soft power” as the ability to get people to do 
what the body exercising power wants by co-optation rather than coercion. In explaining the 
term, Nye referred specifi cally to off ering “values” and other examples, including institutions, 
which are attractive enough to emulate. Joseph S Nye Jr, Soft Power: Th e Means to Success in 
World Politics (New York: PublicAff airs, 2004).
2. See David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “Th e Declining Infl uence of the United States 
Constitution” (2012) 87:3 NYUL Rev 762 [Law & Versteeg, “Declining Infl uence”]. For 
responses to Law & Versteeg, see Sujit Choudhry, “Method in Comparative Constitutional 
Law: A Comment on Law and Versteeg” (2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev 2078; Zachary Elkins, Tom 
Ginsburg & James Melton, “Comments on Law and Versteeg’s Th e Declining Infl uence of the 
United States Constitution” (2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev 2088; and Vicki C Jackson, “Comment 
on Law and Versteeg” (2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev 2102 [Jackson, “Comment”]. For a reply to 
these responses, see David S Law & Mila Versteeg, “Debating Th e Declining Infl uence of the 
United States Constitution: A Response to Professors Choudhry, Jackson and Melkinsburg” 
(2012) 87:6 NYUL Rev Online 41.
3. Anne-Marie Slaughter’s infl uential discussion of transnational networks, for example, deals 
with networks of judges, not constitution makers. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World 
Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) at 65-103. To the extent that there is 
a scholarly literature on the mechanisms by which constitutional provisions are diff used, it 
deals with the role of non-national advisers in drafting national constitutions. See e.g. the 
papers presented at the William & Mary Law Review Symposium on Constitution Drafting 
in Post-Confl ict States (16-17 February 2007), published in (2008) 49:4 Wm & Mary L Rev 
1043 at 1043-541.
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Even more, the very idea of infl uence is vague. Sometimes what might look 
like infl uence—a direct citation of a Canadian constitutional provision or a US 
Supreme Court decision, for example—might be nothing more than a reference 
to a source that provides a useful framework for articulating already existing 
intuitions. Or, the phenomenon might be one of convergence proceeding at 
slightly diff erent paces in diff erent nations, giving the illusion of infl uence but 
actually refl ecting some underlying cause operating everywhere.
Yet, with all the qualifi cations implied by the preceding paragraphs, it seems 
to me that over the past few decades we have seen a shift in the relative infl uence 
of two important constitutions and constitutional courts—those of the United 
States and Canada. Some quantitative analysis indicates that over that period the 
Canadian Charter4 has been more infl uential than the US Constitution,5 where 
infl uence is measured by how similar the text of a nation’s constitution is to the 
Charter and the US Constitution.6 It is certainly my impression that, while decisions 
by the US Supreme Court had substantial infl uence on the development of 
constitutional jurisprudence elsewhere in the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
the Canadian Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has been more 
infl uential since then.7 
In any event, I am going to proceed in this article on the assumption, which I 
believe is borne out by such evidence as there is, that the Charter and the Canadian 
Supreme Court have been relatively more infl uential on other nations than the US 
Constitution and the US Supreme Court since roughly the turn of the century. Th is 
article off ers some speculations about why that might have happened. In alpha-
betical order they are: age; conservatism versus liberalism; doctrine; originalism; 
scholarship and legal training; structure; and openness to transnational infl uence.8 
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
5. US Const.
6. See Law & Versteeg, “Declining Infl uence,” supra note 2. For a criticism of the methodology 
used in this study, see Choudhry, supra note 2.
7. Th ere is an obvious timing question that complicates this analysis. Until 1950 the US 
Supreme Court had essentially no competitors in developing a constitutional jurisprudence, 
so it was bound to be more infl uential elsewhere than any other court. Once the German 
Constitutional Court came into its own, sometime in the late 1950s, a real competitor 
was available, particularly because many jurists from other nations received post-graduate 
education in Germany (as well as in the United States). Th e Canadian Supreme Court was a 
latecomer, attracting attention only with its Charter-based jurisprudence but—to use a racing 
metaphor—it came up quickly on the outside.
8. My analysis builds upon, and to some degree updates, arguments made in Th e Honourable 
Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “Th e Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International 
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I use this order because I do not think that any one factor is more important than 
another; indeed, as I will argue, many of them are tied—sometimes loosely, some-
times more tightly—to others.
At the start, though, I emphasize that I am making several comparisons and 
that my principal comparator jurisdiction is the United States. Sometimes I discuss 
the relative infl uence of the US Constitution and other constitutions, including the 
Canadian Charter; at other times I discuss the relative infl uence of US Supreme 
Court decisions and those of other constitutional courts, including Canada’s. 
I. AGE
Writing in 1816, Th omas Jeff erson described a number of revisions he thought 
appropriate in the US Constitution. Th en, addressing those who “look at constitu-
tions with sanctimonious reverence,” he observed of the framing era, “I knew that 
age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well of its country. It 
was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; and forty 
years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading … .”9 
Th e US Constitution is an old one; the Canadian Charter—and every other 
written constitution in the world—is newer. Th e experience accumulated in the 
many years since the US Constitution’s adoption almost inevitably means that it 
will have lost infl uence relative to newer constitutions.
First, between then and now there have been innovations in the mechanics 
of governance. Examples include the invention of the specialized constitutional 
court and of the single transferable vote; the creation of a fourth branch composed 
of administrative bureaucracies; and the formation of a fi fth branch consisting of 
various transparency institutions such as anticorruption agencies and boundary 
commissions for districting. Th e US Constitution can be amended or creatively 
interpreted to accommodate the innovations that seem appropriate to US citizens 
today. But, after the innovations have come about, those designing constitutions 
can simply build the desirable innovations into the constitutions they are proposing. 
Innovation alone would account for some reduction in the infl uence of the US Con-
stitution relative to newer ones, though it would not account for which more recent 
constitutions have become more infl uential.
Impact of the Rehnquist Court” (1998) 34:1 Tulsa LJ 15. See also Adam M Dodek, “Canada 
as Constitutional Exporter: Th e Rise of the ‘Canadian Model’ of Constitutionalism” (2007) 
36 Sup Ct L Rev 2d 309.
9. Th omas Jeff erson to Samuel Kercheval (12 June 1816), online: <http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=459>.
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Th e Charter implements one innovation in the technology of governance 
through the Canadian version of what I have called “weak-form review.”10 I discuss 
this in more detail below in Part VI, and for now I note only that weak-form 
review was truly an innovation in 1982. Like all good inventions, weak-form 
review has been tweaked and perhaps improved elsewhere. Th ese developments 
are follow-ons to the Canadian innovation and so they are properly considered 
examples of Canadian infl uence on other constitutions.
Second, and more relevant to this article’s theme, time has revealed that 
governments can overreach in more ways than the authors of the US Constitution 
anticipated, often as a result of technological developments, and also that the 
deployment of government power may sometimes be more desirable than those 
authors believed. Th e rights inscribed in the US Constitution and the powers 
available to the national government in the United States might be thought 
too limited today. Again, in the United States these matters have been dealt 
with by occasional constitutional amendments and, more frequently, creative 
interpretations. Yet, once again, the experience of more than two hundred years 
allows today’s constitution drafters to address these new problems of rights and 
powers more directly.
Here the Charter off ers some examples. First, section 2(b) guarantees “freedom 
… of other media of communication,”11 which provides a fi rmer textual base for 
protecting expression on the Internet and in social media than does the US First 
Amendment.12 Second, the Charter takes a more detailed approach to equality 
rights than does the US Constitution. In the United States, equality under state 
laws is guaranteed by a general equality clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.13 
Th is clause creates textual awkwardness in connection with guarantees of equality 
under national law, there being no similar general equality clause applicable to 
the national government. And, perhaps more important, experience has shown 
that particular classes can be special targets of discrimination, and that it takes 
more eff ort to deal with those classes through the interpretation of a general 
10. “Weak-form review” refers to a practice in which a high court’s decision fi nding a statute 
unconstitutional can be revised by a legislature through some mechanism other than 
constitutional amendment. For a recent discussion, see Mark Tushnet, “Th e rise of weak-
form judicial review” in Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon, eds, Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 321.
11. Charter, supra note 4, s 2(b).
12. US Const amend I (stating that “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press…”).
13. US Const amend XIV (stating that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws”).
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equality clause than when those classes (or at least some of them) are specifi cally listed 
in the constitution, as in section 15 of the Charter. Augmenting a general equality 
clause with a list of protected classes and a catch-all statement allowing extensions 
by analogy, as section 15’s “in particular” does (albeit somewhat indirectly), provides 
more guidance than a general equality clause alone.14 
Th ird, equality clauses, whether general or with lists of protected classes, 
typically create problems in connection with affi  rmative action programs because 
the classes are described in general terms such as “race” or “gender.” Th e solution, 
widely adopted, lies in stating in the constitution that equality guarantees do 
not “preclude any law … that has as its object the amelioration of conditions 
of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged” 
by their membership in the specially protected classes, as section 15(2) puts it.15 
Th is is not to say that the same result could not be reached under a general equality 
clause, but only that experience showed the value of specifi cally identifying 
affi  rmative action as permissible no matter what the general or enumerated 
equality clauses said.
A more limited but probably important eff ect of the relative ages of the US and 
Canadian constitutions is that the latter is temporally closer to modern international 
human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.16 Judges 
seeking to participate in the worldwide network of constitutional court judges fi nd it 
natural to use the terms of those documents in their interactions, and those terms 
more readily fi t within the contours of the Charter than within those of the US 
Bill of Rights.17 So, when looking for sources that seem similar to those animating 
the international human rights documents, those judges will discover more value 
in Canadian than in US doctrine.
Drafters of modern constitutions can take account of experience in a 
way that the drafters of the US Constitution could not. Th e age of the US 
Constitution therefore limits its infl uence—though again I emphasize that this 
point does not single out the Canadian Charter as particularly infl uential among 
modern constitutions.
14. However, identifying the specially protected classes in the constitution does not solve the 
problems that experience can reveal, as has become clear in connection with discrimination 
against gay, lesbian, and transgendered people.
15. Charter, supra note 4, s 15(2).
16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217(III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No 13, 
UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) 71 [Universal Declaration].
17. US Const amends I-X.
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II. CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM
Drafted in the 1780s and with no large-scale amendments after the 1860s, the 
US Constitution refl ects the presuppositions of classical liberalism. Th ough it 
does not rule out choices refl ecting modern ideas of social democracy, neither does 
it enshrine them as matters of deep constitutional value.18 Constitutions adopted 
in the twentieth century, in contrast, have been deeply infl uenced by ideas of 
social solidarity, Christian democracy, and social democracy. Parties seeking 
large-scale transformations in property distribution typically led the national 
independence movements that resulted in colonial independence. A classically 
liberal constitution did not provide an acceptable model, at least not immediately. 
Constitution makers in the nations of the former Soviet empire clearly rejected 
socialism as a constitutional model, but even those most committed to classical 
liberalism understood that their nations’ peoples had come to accept some degree 
of social democracy as a foundation for their specifi c form of constitutionalism. 
Th e US Constitution could not be a model for them, either. Yet, it is worth noting 
that neither could the Charter. Th ough adopted in 1982 and in a nation where 
social solidarity is far more deeply embedded than in the United States, the Charter 
refl ects no social democratic commitments, as Gosselin confi rms.19
Th e situation with the US and Canadian Supreme Courts is diff erent. Th e 
great waves of constitutionalization that occurred in the 1970s, mostly in Latin 
America, and the 1980s and 1990s, mostly in central and eastern Europe, were 
waves of liberalization after the demise of authoritarianism. When those waves 
occurred, the Warren Court dominated the world’s image of the US Supreme 
Court,20 which then became characterized as a liberal court, where “liberal” is a 
term describing not a deep political theory but the ordinary politics of the day.21 
18. Th e US Constitution was not formally amended to accommodate the expansion of national 
power, and the increasing role of social democracy, after the New Deal. Th at in turn eased 
the path to constitutional challenges to Th e Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act, 
which would have been more diffi  cult had there been a formal constitutional amendment 
embodying the New Deal “settlement.” See Th e Patient Protection and Aff ordable Care Act, 
Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
19. Gosselin v Québec (Attorney General), 2002 SCC 84, 4 SCR 429. In this context I mean 
only that Gosselin provides no model for nations with social democratic constitutional 
commitments to emulate and do not mean to take a position on the decision’s correctness as 
a matter of Canadian constitutional law.
20. As discussed in Mary L Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American 
Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
21. See e.g. Lucas A Powe, Jr, Th e Warren Court and American Politics (Cambridge: Th e Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2000).
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Constitutional courts in these nations could, if they chose, use the Warren Court’s 
decisions as a model for their own. Th is was particularly true with respect to 
some issues central to the transition from authoritarianism to liberal consti-
tutionalism: for example, the regulation of speech critical of the government in 
power and the regulation of the criminal process to avoid politically motivated 
abuses. Th e Warren Court had a well-developed jurisprudence that courts elsewhere 
could follow or even adopt wholesale. During these periods the infl uence of the 
US Supreme Court outside the United States was at its peak.
Yet even when the Warren Court dominated understanding of the US 
Supreme Court, the Court’s liberal image had become inaccurate, and the 
inaccuracies became more apparent from the 1990s through the present. Th e 
Warren Court ended formally in 1969, with Earl Warren’s replacement by Warren 
Burger, though the Warren Court’s liberal jurisprudence staggered on for about 
two decades more. But by no later than the turn of the century the illusion that 
the US Supreme Court was a liberal court could not be sustained. And yet, with 
the transition from authoritarianism still incomplete in many places, judges on 
constitutional courts who hoped to advance the liberalization project still needed 
models. With the US Supreme Court no longer helpful, they turned elsewhere—
namely, to the German Constitutional Court and the Canadian Supreme Court.
At least tangentially related to the issue of conservatism versus liberalism 
is a complex of political economy issues.22 One aspect of the contemporary US 
Supreme Court’s decisions is a tendency to restrict the scope of constitutional 
adjudication, for example, by imposing stringent standing requirements or 
by adopting doctrines that expressly incorporate a standard of deference to 
legislatures. Although that tendency is in fact highly qualifi ed, with the Court 
endorsing what remains a rather generous approach to standing and being 
deferential only on occasion,23 I believe that the relevant non-US audiences 
would describe the Court’s current jurisprudence as restrictive. Now consider a 
nation with a new constitution after an authoritarian era. Th e constitution will of 
course include a constitutional court. Yet, if that court entertains constitutional 
challenges only rarely or is quite deferential to the political branches, citizens 
22. I owe this paragraph to comments from Vicki Jackson.
23. On standing, see e.g. Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency, 549 US 497, 127 
S Ct 1438 (2007) (holding that a state, as an owner of shorefront property, had standing 
to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s refusal to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions, because the failure to regulate might lead to global warming that would raise sea 
levels and so deprive the state of some of its property). Th e Court’s free speech jurisprudence 
is notably non-deferential. For an exception, see Holder v Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S 
Ct 2705, 177 L Ed 2d 355 (2010).
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might wonder what value they were getting from the court.24 And, from the 
court’s point of view, ruling in favour of constitutional claims presented to it can 
demonstrate its value and thereby create some legitimacy for a novel institution.
Here, too, a note of caution is appropriate. Th e method by which the judges on 
the German Constitutional Court are selected guarantees a balanced jurisprudence 
that will always contain important liberal elements in both the political theory 
and quotidian senses. Th e deep commitments of the German Basic Law as a 
response to the National Socialist era further guarantees the presence of these 
liberal elements. Lacking that historical experience, the Charter’s commitments 
to quotidian liberalism are, I think, weaker. And, perhaps more important, the 
methods of judicial selection in Canada can produce a succession of courts, with 
liberal ones being replaced, as in the United States, by more conservative ones. 
For the moment, the Canadian Supreme Court may be more infl uential around 
the world than the US Supreme Court, but that could change. 
On a more mundane level, some of the US Supreme Court’s decisions are 
puzzling (or worse) to those from diff erent constitutional traditions. Th at people 
in the United States have a constitutional right, of whatever uncertain scope, to 
possess handguns for self-protection is, I think, quite surprising to people elsewhere. 
In the area of free expression, decisions sharply restricting the regulation of hate 
speech and campaign fi nancing—characterized as conservative decisions—confl ict 
with the constitutional jurisprudence of most other nations.25 Th eir conservatism 
tarnishes the image of the US Constitution, or at least the image of the US Supreme 
Court.26 And, the defense of the US decisions as part of a coherent overall 
24. See Stephen Holmes & Cass R Sunstein, “Th e Politics of Constitutional Amendment in 
Eastern Europe” in Sanford Levinson, ed, Responding to Imperfection: Th e Th eory and Practice 
of Constitutional Amendment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) 275 at 284-85 
(stating that “the very creation of a constitutional culture in post-Communist societies 
depends upon a willingness to mix constitutional politics and ordinary politics”). Stephen 
Holmes and Cass Sunstein argue, with many qualifi cations, that these nations might be 
getting an experience of self-governance that the authoritarian regime had denied them. I 
note that recent revisions to the Hungarian Constitution sharply limiting the Constitutional 
Court’s role and altering its composition are widely viewed as opening up the possibility of a 
return to authoritarian rule.
25. For overviews of these topics, see Michel Rosenfeld, “Regulation of Hate Speech” in Vikram 
David Amar & Mark V Tushnet, eds, Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) 181; Richard L Hasen, “Regulation of Campaign Finance” in 
ibid, 198.
26. As Benjamin Berger suggested in his comments on an earlier version of this article, the 
death penalty cases may not only make reference to the US Supreme Court unattractive but 
sometimes perhaps affi  rmatively harmful if the taint associated with that Court would spread 
to the citing court.
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structure of constitutional doctrine actually makes things worse. It might remove 
the “taint” associated with the label “conservative,” but it does so at the cost of 
making the US Constitution less attractive as a whole.
III. DOCTRINE
Th e core of the story about constitutional doctrine is simple, though its details 
are rather complex. Proportionality may not be the ultimate rule of law, as David 
Beatty would have it,27 but it is an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
many judges around the world fi nd attractive. Proportionality as a doctrine is 
not unknown in US constitutional history, where it—or something that could 
have been recast as proportionality—was known under the label “balancing.”28 
As constitutions and constitutional courts were created in the late twentieth 
century, the US Supreme Court abandoned balancing as a doctrine in favour of 
a more rules-oriented approach largely because of the sequence of cases it faced, 
dealing fi rst with classic sedition cases and then cases arising out of the US 
movement for civil rights for African Americans. In legal theory, Robert Alexy 
set out a structured framework for conducting a proportionality analysis; in 
constitutional doctrine, the Canadian Supreme Court did the same in Oakes.29 
So, Canada off ered the world’s constitutional courts a doctrinal formulation 
compatible with judges’ deepest instincts, and the US Supreme Court did not. 
Under the circumstances, the decline in the infl uence of the US Supreme Court 
relative to the Canadian Supreme Court is entirely understandable.
Now for some of the details. Th e US Supreme Court turned against balancing 
in large part because the Court became more conservative. Scholars have shown 
in enormous detail that there is no necessary connection between legal ideology and 
interpretive approaches: Th ere can be conservative balancing and liberal rules, for 
example.30 But, in the late twentieth century, the association between the Court’s 
conservative turn and its abandonment of balancing was forged by conservatives 
27. David M Beatty, Th e Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
28. On the diff erences between proportionality and balancing, see Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo 
Porat, “American balancing and German proportionality: Th e historical origins” (2010) 8:2 
Int’l J Const L 263; Jacco Bomhoff , “Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing 
as a Problematic Turn in Comparative (Constitutional) Law” (2008) 31:2 Hastings Int’l & 
Comp L Rev 555.
29. Robert Alexy, A Th eory of Constitutional Rights, translated by Julian Rivers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200.
30. See e.g. Kathleen M Sullivan, “Th e Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword: Th e Justices of 
Rules and Standards” (1992) 106:1 Harv L Rev 22.
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in their critique of the Warren Court. To condense what is again a complicated 
story: Conservatives criticized the Warren Court for doing no more than enacting 
the liberal justices’ policy preferences into constitutional law, pretending that 
the law contained those preferences all along. Th ey were, as conservatives put it, 
simply making things up. Th e way to avoid making things up was to adopt origi-
nalism as an interpretive theory. But with originalism in hand, conservatives 
came to think that, except in the rare situations where the original understandings 
licensed the judges to balance interests, balancing amounted to making things 
up, too.31
While proportionality analysis remains an important part of US constitutional 
doctrine, it plays a role that can be teased out only by careful examination of specifi c 
constitutional doctrines, rather than a role that appears on the doctrinal surface. As 
Alexy and others have discussed, judges and analysts can treat proportionality as 
an approach that operates within specifi c doctrines or as something that determines 
the boundaries within and outside of which diff erent rules prevail.32 In the United 
States proportionality operates as a boundary-determining doctrine. In the area 
of free speech, it operates under the name of “categorical balancing.”33 When used 
to determine doctrinal boundaries, though, the approach, at least as developed by 
the US Supreme Court, does not bring all the relevant considerations to the surface. 
In contrast, Oakes off ers a much more perspicuous account of proportionality, with 
a structured approach readily adoptable by other courts.34
Th is analysis off ers a perspective on Frederick Schauer’s argument that 
constitutional courts outside the United States are attracted to proportionality 
and the open discussion of the steps involved because they are developing doctrine 
from a low baseline.35 Schauer argues that judges feeling their way into a new 
31. For a general account of the rise of originalism in response to Warren Court decisions, with 
some passing comments on balancing, see Johnathan O’Neill, Originalism in American 
Law and Politics: A Constitutional History (Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2005), ch 3.
32. Alexy, supra note 29. Notably, Alexy argues that viewing proportionality as internal makes 
the most sense of German constitutional doctrine, but not that such an understanding is 
required by the very idea of proportionality.
33. Its originalist commitments led the US Supreme Court to reject, though with inadequate 
reasons, the use of categorical balancing to identify subjects of regulation not otherwise 
identifi ed in the relevant historical materials. See United States v Stevens, 130 S Ct 1577, 176 
L Ed 2d 435 (2010).
34. And, in my view, the approach in Oakes is easier to understand than Alexy’s—especially with 
respect to Alexy’s eff ort to mathematize his approach.
35. Frederick Schauer, “Th e Convergence of Rules and Standards” [2003] NZL Rev 303 at 326-
27; Frederick Schauer, “Freedom of expression adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
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doctrinal fi eld will be attracted to proportionality tests to ensure that they do 
not ignore features of the problem that a well-designed legal system would take 
into account. As they gain experience, though, judges learn that some things that 
were seemingly relevant in the past almost never play a dispositive role and can 
be ignored thereafter. Rules then emerge when courts formulate doctrines that, 
as rules necessarily do, screen from judicial consideration features of the problem 
that are too often mistakenly thought relevant. Note, though, that this is, or at 
least is very close to, a description of the way in which proportionality operates as 
a boundary-defi ning approach. If Schauer is right, we can imagine that the relative 
infl uence of the US and Canadian Supreme Courts on other courts might reverse 
itself as those courts gain experience and the need for the structure made available 
by Oakes weakens.
IV. ORIGINALISM
Th omas Jeff erson referred to the “reverence” that US citizens gave to the Constitution’s 
authors just before 1820.36 If anything, that reverence has increased with time. It has 
made originalism a distinctively US form of constitutional interpretation, followed 
almost nowhere else,37 or at least without anything like the rigour with which it is 
used in the United States. I hasten to add that originalism is only one mode of 
constitutional interpretation in the United States and perhaps not even the dominant 
one. Yet, it is probably the interpretive approach that has attracted the most 
attention in the United States and elsewhere. In another example of how the 
reasons for changes in relative infl uence are interconnected, the rise of originalism 
is associated with the increasing conservatism of the US Supreme Court. As 
discussed above in Part III, originalism developed as the conservative interpretive 
theory challenging the Warren Court’s liberalism.
Originalism lacks a hold in other constitutional systems for several reasons. 
First, with a few notable exceptions such as Germany and India, modern 
constitutions are new. Th eir authors are still alive or have only recently died. I 
suspect that in the fi rst generation or two after a constitution is adopted, people 
do not think that they are engaged in a process of interpreting the constitution. 
a case study in comparative constitutional architecture” in Georg Nolte, ed, European and US 
Constitutionalism (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 49 at 49-56.
36. Jeff erson, supra note 9. 
37. Australia comes closest, I think, and even there the justifi cation for the prevailing interpretive 
approach is called “formalist” rather than originalist. For a discussion of Australian 
formalism (or legalism), see Jeff rey Goldsworthy, “Australia: Devotion to Legalism” in Jeff rey 
Goldsworthy, ed, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (2006) 106.
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Rather, they understand themselves to be simply reading it. And reading does not 
have to be deeply theorized.
Second, knowledgeable interpreters of relatively new constitutions know that 
these documents are messy combinations of deep principle and the political deals 
needed to secure the constitution’s proposal and adoption. Th ey know who the 
deal makers were, they know their quirks, and they know that it is a mistake to 
interpret the constitution as a wholly integrated and principled document whose 
parts fi t smoothly together. Some of those responsible for bringing a constitutional 
project to fruition, like B.R. Ambedkar, are indeed revered today; others, such as 
Eamon de Valera, less so.38 With the passage of time, perhaps these deals will fade 
into the background and originalism will seem more attractive. But, for now and 
to many, originalism seems at odds with the political reality from which recently 
created constitutions emerged.39
Perhaps as a result of these contingent facts, the US theory of originalism lacks 
a good foothold elsewhere. Th is lack is exacerbated by some of the arguments 
made in support of originalism. So, for example, the argument that originalism 
is validated by a written text cannot be taken seriously by people who already 
fi nd originalism odd, because reliance on the text itself is a form of originalism. 
Moreover, originalism as an express theory of interpretation is relatively new 
in the United States, emerging in the late 1970s as a basis for conservative 
criticism of the Warren Court and its liberal rulings.40 For those not embedded 
in US controversies, originalism could be seen as something added on to exist-
ing interpretive methods, not as something that cast doubt on their validity. 
Th erefore, outside the United States, other interpretive methods could survive 
without much diffi  culty.
38. BR Ambedkar was the principal drafter of the Indian Constitution; Eamon de Valera 
was the political leader of Irish independence who shepherded the Irish Constitution of 
1937 to adoption.
39. Consider here the contested origins of the notwithstanding clause and its emergence as a 
way of getting First Ministers from several provinces to accept the Charter as a whole despite 
their misgivings about its departure from parliamentary supremacy—close to a raw political 
deal—and the way the clause functions in the principled defense of weak-form constitutional 
review. For a brief description of the political background underlying the notwithstanding 
clause, see Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare 
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 
52-53 [Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights]. Outsiders like me, and Canadians (as memory 
of the negotiations over framing the Charter fade), can off er a principled defence of the 
notwithstanding clause, a defence that will undoubtedly seem rather too fancy for those who 
still remember how it came into being.
40. See O’Neill, supra note 31.
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Notably, Canada supplies the most powerful metaphorical counter to 
originalism: the “living tree” metaphor from the Persons Case.41 In the United 
States, the idea of a living constitution is juxtaposed to originalism. Essentially 
everywhere else, the “living tree” metaphor describes the alternative and preferred 
approach to constitutional interpretation.42 Th e Canadian Supreme Court’s 
commitment to the “living tree” metaphor casts a benevolent light over its 
decisions, or at least casts a better light on its decisions than the US Supreme 
Court’s commitment (such as it is) to originalism casts on its own decisions.
V. SCHOLARSHIP AND LEGAL TRAINING
In the 1960s and 1970s, US constitutional scholarship defi ned the terms of the 
debate about the legitimacy and scope of review. Alexander Bickel’s identifi cation 
of the so-called countermajoritarian diffi  culty seemed particularly important in 
nations with newly established or newly empowered constitutional courts, most 
dramatically in nations with long traditions of parliamentary supremacy.43 John 
Hart Ely’s work on representation-reinforcing review off ered a response to Bickel 
that scholars of constitutional law outside the United States found attractive.44 
Th ese intellectual infl uences were reinforced by patterns of postgraduate legal 
education. Many scholars from around the world found opportunities for graduate 
study in the United States, where they absorbed the terminology and the substance 
of discussions within US constitutional law and theory.
As newer constitutional courts gained experience and power, the concerns 
emerging from US theory weakened. Th e countermajoritarian anxiety, which 
continues to defi ne important contours of US constitutional theory, faded as 
scholars and courts turned their attention to actually implementing the constitutions 
they had. Th e countermajoritarian diffi  culty morphed into concern over defi ning 
41. Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] AC 124 at 136, [1929] All ER Rep 571 PC (Eng).
42. I hazard a guess that the main competitor to the “living tree” metaphor is the German idea 
that a constitution embodies an “objective order of values.” See Lüth Case, 7 BVerfGE 198, 
1958 NJW 257 (Fed Const Ct) (Germany), translated in Donald P Kommers & Russell A 
Miller, Th e Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 3d ed, (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012) at 442-48.
43. Alexander M Bickel, Th e Least Dangerous Branch: Th e Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
44. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Th eory of Judicial Review (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980) (rejecting constitutional interpretations that rely solely on either the 
text or underlying moral values; instead arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted 
in a way that reinforces representative democracy).
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how proportionality review could be conducted and defended. Furthermore, 
patterns of postgraduate legal training changed—or, at least, existing patterns 
of postgraduate training in private law were modifi ed to include postgraduate 
training in public law. To oversimplify: Scholars-in-training from Australia and 
other Commonwealth nations had always received postgraduate instruction in 
Great Britain; those from East Asia had received instruction in Germany. Now, 
their successors received instruction in the same locations, but in public as well as 
private law. Th e specifi c concerns of US constitutional law and theory no longer 
play as central a role in postgraduate training as they used to. And, unsurprisingly, 
the infl uence of US concerns has diminished.
Canada plays only a small part in that story, but a larger one in a related 
account. Relying heavily on the arguments for federalism and separation of 
powers in Th e Federalist Papers,45 US constitutional scholarship treats those 
institutional arrangements as locations for confl ict and struggle, with the end 
of protecting liberty by limiting government power. In contrast, Canada’s legal 
culture, refl ecting its culture more generally, treats those institutional arrangements 
as locations for cooperation and for the production of freedom-enhancing 
government policies. Th e Canadian way of thinking resonates more substantially 
with nations whose constitutions and politics embody principles of subsidiarity 
and social solidarity—roughly speaking, social democratic nations, which make up 
a large set of nations embracing the post-World War II model of constitutionalism. 
Canadian ways of thinking may be more congenial than US ones in such nations.
VI. STRUCTURE AND STRONG JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Consider the situation of many constitution drafters in the second half of the 
twentieth century. Some—perhaps most—were in nations with a tradition of 
either parliamentary supremacy or presidential domination, and of these many 
were dealing with transitions from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. 
Some form of constitutional review by independent courts was enormously 
attractive as a defense against a reversion to authoritarianism. But, what form 
of constitutional review?
Th e United States off ered one model: a system of strong judicial supremacy 
(strong-form review) backed up by an amendment rule that makes overturning 
judicial decisions by constitutional amendment diffi  cult. Th at system raised a 
number of problems. First, and probably least important, staffi  ng the courts with 
45. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, Th e Federalist, ed by Jacob E Cooke 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961).
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judges committed to liberal democracy was going to be quite diffi  cult. Most of the 
judges in place had been reliable servants of the prior regime, and the new regime’s 
leaders were inevitably suspicious of them.46 Second, strong judicial supremacy 
threatened to replace one group of unaccountable rulers, the authoritarians, with 
another, the judges. Th e spectre of gouvernement des juges47 continued to haunt. 
Finally, as Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein argued, albeit somewhat too strongly, 
the newly empowered citizens in these nations had been politically infantilized and 
needed to act politically in ways that embodied their new responsibilities as citizens.48 
Strong judicial supremacy might impede the required maturation by communi-
cating to citizens that they could continue to be irresponsible because someone 
else would bail them out of whatever diffi  culties they created.
Th e Charter off ered an interesting alternative to strong judicial supremacy 
(through what I have called weak-form review),49 by way of section 1’s general 
limitations clause and section 33’s notwithstanding clause. Th e Charter’s precise 
contours, and even the justifi cations off ered by Canadian scholars for the Charter’s 
version of constitutional review,50 mattered less than the simple fact that it opened 
the way to creative thinking about the structure of constitutional review. To many 
constitution drafters, this weak-form constitutional review was a more attractive 
reconciliation of the requirements implicit in liberal democracy—roughly, rights-
protection and self-government—than US-style strong-form review. And, fi nally, 
Canada provided the fi rst real model for weak-form review.51 Notably, as a model, 
the Canadian provisions might be followed or developed despite the practically 
non-existent use of section 33 to override parliamentary legislation.
46. Th is was true, I think, even where the judges asserted, with some plausibility, that they 
were strong positivists committed to fair enforcement of the law given to them, whatever 
its content. Th ey had been reliable servants of the authoritarian regime because they were 
positivists, and would be equally reliable servants of liberal democracy for the same reason.
47. Edouard Lambert, Le gouvernement des juges et la lutte contre la législation social aux États-
Unis: l’expérience américaine du contrôle judiciare de la constitutionnalité des lois (Paris: Marcel 
Giard & Cie, 1921).
48. Holmes & Sunstein, supra note 24 at 306.
49. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, supra note 39.
50. I have in mind here the diff erent characterizations off ered by those scholars of “dialogue” as 
a distinctive and important feature of the Charter regime. For a collection of essays on the 
concept of dialogue, see the special issue of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal entitled “Charter 
Dialogue: Ten Years Later,” (2007) 45:1 Osgoode Hall LJ.
51. It may be worth noting that even in the United States defenders of constitutional review have 
become increasingly agnostic about whether the reasons for constitutional review support 
only strong-form review or, instead, can be satisfi ed by weak-form review. See, e.g. Richard H 
Fallon, Jr, “Th e Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review” (2008) 121:7 Harv L Rev 1693.
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Note as well that, to the extent that the general limitations clause plays a part 
in the defense of weak-form review, the reason for the greater relative infl uence of 
Canada compared to the United States converges with the doctrinal developments 
sketched in the preceding Part. Here, then, we can see how the Charter and 
the Canadian Supreme Court have contributed to the shift in “soft power” 
towards Canada. 
VII. TRANSNATIONAL INFLUENCE
I begin this Part with the mundane observation that the US Supreme Court 
issues its decisions in one of the world’s dominant legal languages, and the 
Canadian Supreme Court does so in two. Even as English becomes the world’s 
lingua franca, the Canadian Supreme Court’s decisions are overall more accessible 
to interested audiences than are the US Court’s decisions. Th ough done for 
wholly domestic reasons, the Canadian Supreme Court’s practice enhances 
its reputation abroad.52
As Vicki Jackson has shown, the US Supreme Court has a long tradition of 
referring to non-US law in interpreting the US Constitution. Th ese references 
are predominantly, but not exclusively, to the law of countries in the common 
law tradition.53 Sometimes these references could be understood as attempts to 
determine the meaning of terms in the US Constitution that are derived from the 
common law, even when the references were to post-1789 common law. More 
often, the references were embedded in an eclectic approach to constitutional 
interpretation. For example, the Court might refer to experience with particular 
forms of criminal procedure in other nations to show that interpreting the US 
Constitution to require those forms would have good or bad consequences.54 
More recently, although the practice of referring to non-US law continues, it has 
become controversial. Th e reason, in part, is the rise of originalism in constitutional 
interpretation. Referring to sources from the present day, whether those sources 
are from outside or within the United States, is thought to be inconsistent with 
originalism’s exclusive focus on events and understandings at the time that the 
relevant constitutional provisions were adopted.
52. An antic thought: Perhaps the Canadian Supreme Court should consider off ering offi  cial 
translations of selected decisions into German (the world’s third legal language).
53. Vicki C Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010) at ch 4 [Jackson, Constitutional Engagement].
54. Or to refute claims that such an interpretation would have bad consequences. See e.g. 
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602 at 1652-53 (1966).
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More important, though, has been the association of this practice with 
litigation challenging the death penalty (and, more recently, litigation challenging 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and challenging the conditions 
of confi nement at “supermax”—super-maximum security—prisons). On many 
issues, US constitutional law is reasonably “good” from the perspective of the 
transnational NGOs that have become involved in this litigation, so referring 
to non-US law adds nothing to the arguments available from the US legal 
materials alone. And, on many other issues, the United States occupies a position 
on a spectrum of possibilities, many of which have been realized elsewhere. So, 
to overstate, with respect to these issues, every citation to a non-US source favouring 
one position could be countered by a citation to another non-US source favouring 
the position already in place in the United States. Consider, for example, the question 
of gay marriage. Th ose who believe that gay marriage is inherent in principles of 
equality can certainly point to statutes and constitutional holdings in other nations, 
including Canada. But, of course, those who believe that gay marriage is at most 
a matter of legislative policy choice can point to statutes and constitutional holdings 
in a diff erent group of nations. Again, the reference to non-US materials would 
be largely pointless.55
Death penalty and, more generally, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is 
diff erent. First, as a matter of stated doctrine, the US Supreme Court has held 
that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted with reference to the “evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”56 Th at doctrine 
invites (though it does not compel) reference to the standards as they have evolved 
in other maturing societies. In addition, capital punishment and related issues are 
ones about which there really is a transnational consensus against the US position. 
In consequence, referring to non-US law points in a single direction.57
Th e association between references to non-US law and the campaign against 
the death penalty and related issues created the controversy over such references.58 
55. I can imagine an argument identifying an international trend toward a consensus position, 
even though that position is not yet the consensus. I think that casting this argument in 
terms that fi t well with US constitutional doctrine would likely be quite diffi  cult. 
56. Trop v Dulles, 356 US 86 at 101, 78 S Ct 590 (1958).
57. Or, at worst, it puts the advocates of the contrary position at a rhetorical disadvantage: “Do 
you want the United States to be like Somalia?”
58. I should note, as Professor Jackson has pointed out, that justices opposed to the US Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence dealing with the right to choose with respect to abortion sometimes 
argue that US jurisprudence on this issue is as much an international outlier as the US 
position on the death penalty. She argues, though, that the gap between stated jurisprudence 
and actual practice is substantial (on both sides), making the US practice and the non-US 
jurisprudence and practice roughly compatible with each other. (I should note that this is my 
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Once it existed, though, critics of the practice in death penalty cases created 
a general theoretical case against such references, not confi ned to observations 
about originalism. As a result, there is now a general controversy over references 
to non-US law in US constitutional interpretation.
Th e implications of that controversy for the infl uence of US Supreme Court 
decisions elsewhere are reasonably clear. Informally, the thought by judges outside 
the United States is, “If you are not going to listen to us, why should we listen 
to you?” Somewhat more formally, exercising soft power—infl uence—requires a 
certain kind of gentle reciprocity short of equal exchange. Th e controversy over 
references to non-US law shows that there is a real possibility that being infl uenced 
by US constitutional law will not be reciprocated.
Th e Canadian Supreme Court is entirely comfortable with referring to non-
Canadian law in interpreting the Charter. Of course, so are many other nations 
with respect to their own constitutions. Th is factor too helps explain the declining 
infl uence of the US Supreme Court’s decisions without explaining why the Canadian 
Supreme Court has become distinctively more infl uential. Here I can only hazard 
the guess that openness to non-Canadian sources is one of several factors, including 
liberalism and the accessibility of its opinions that, taken together, give the 
Canadian Supreme Court a “boost” elsewhere.
VIII. CONCLUSION
As I suggested at the outset, the reasons one might have for attempting to determine 
the infl uence of a specifi c constitution or constitutional court’s decisions are 
somewhat obscure. National pride plays a part, of course, which can be characterized 
alternatively as preening (pejoratively) or kvelling (approvingly).59
A scholar’s perspective complicates the view. Probably most important, sorting 
out the infl uences of a host of factors is likely to be quite diffi  cult. Take 
proportionality: I have discussed Alexy and Oakes, but the phrasing that licenses 
proportionality review in Canada, “such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justifi ed in a free and democratic society,”60 fi nds a parallel 
in section 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
characterization of her position, not hers.) See Jackson, Constitutional Engagement, supra 
note 53.
59. “To kvell” (from the Yiddish) means “to express pride in the accomplishments of someone to 
whom one is related, usually a son or daughter.”
60. Charter, supra note 4, s 1.
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respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”61 When 
other constitutions adopt (in their own languages) phrases that are used in the 
Charter, are we observing the infl uence of the Charter, the infl uence of the 
Universal Declaration, or the infl uence of more general ideas about the proper 
relation between government power and protection of rights?62 When other 
nations’ constitutional courts cite Oakes as they perform proportionality review, 
might not the citation be “decoration” rather than an example of infl uence? 
Similar arguments could be made about section 33 and the override power. 
It has conceptual antecedents in emergency powers provisions common in 
constitutions since the early twentieth century (if not Roman times): Emergency 
powers could override constitutional protections when imperatively required by 
national conditions. Should emergency powers be taken as the true origin of weak-
form judicial review rather than section 33 and the general limitations clause?
Finally, a thought about example-setting as a way of exercising soft power: 
With the caveat that I am not familiar with the literature on soft power and may 
be making a point addressed in that literature, I wonder whether a nation can 
exercise soft power once the means of doing so is identifi ed and labelled in those 
very terms. Th at is, I wonder about the eff ects of an open acknowledgement along 
the following lines: “Th e United States (or Canada) knows that it lacks the coercive 
force to compel you to follow its lead, but is trying to induce you to do so by 
off ering the examples of the Constitution (or Charter) and the Supreme Court to 
demonstrate that the US (or Canadian) system overall is so attractive that you ought 
to follow the United States (or Canada) as a leader in some relevant domain.” My 
sense, but it is only that, is that acknowledging that some practice is an exercise 
of soft power deprives the practice of its eff ectiveness as such an exercise.
In the end, then, discussing the relative infl uence of the US Constitution and 
the Canadian Charter may only be a parlour game. But, I confess, I fi nd it engaging 
at least for some few moments.
61. Universal Declaration, supra note 16, art 29(2) (at 76-77).
62. Commenting on Law & Versteeg, “Declining Infl uence,” supra note 2, Vicki Jackson suggests 
that some of the most important ways in which the US Constitution has been infl uential is 
in putting on the table the very idea that constitutions ought to be written and in off ering 
an example of institutionalizing the separation of powers. Yet, one might respond that the 
ultimate sources of infl uence here would be Aristotle, John Locke, and Montesquieu, and 
determining whether their ideas were infl uential through the mediating eff ects of the US 
Constitution would be quite diffi  cult. See Jackson, “Comment,” supra note 2.
